国内统一连续出版物号:CN 11-1384/F

国际标准连续出版物号:ISSN 1000-7636

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企业数字化转型对分析师预测准确性的影响

企业数字化转型对分析师预测准确性的影响

袁蓉丽1 刘梦瑶1 黄泽烨1 沈丽萍2

(1.中国人民大学;2.玉溪师范学院)


内容提要:在推进数字技术结合实体经济协同发展的背景下,数字化转型在持续推动企业发展与保持竞争力方面发挥着关键作用。本文以2007—2023年中国A股上市公司为样本,探讨企业数字化转型对分析师预测准确性的影响及潜在机制。研究结果表明,企业的数字化转型有助于提升分析师预测的准确性。在进行了内生性分析及稳健性检验后,上述结论依然成立。会计信息可比性的增加和企业内部控制的改善是数字化转型提升分析师预测准确性的两个机制。异质性分析结果表明,对于客户集中度低、业务复杂程度高、处于不确定性高环境和位于市场化程度低地区的企业,数字化转型对分析师预测准确性的提升效果更明显。本文的研究结论有助于深入理解企业数字化转型的经济后果,为政府推动和完善数字化转型政策提供参考。

关键词:数字化转型;分析师预测;管理层机会主义;会计信息可比性;内部控制

作者简介:袁蓉丽,中国人民大学商学院教授、博士生导师,北京,100872;刘梦瑶,中国人民大学商学院博士研究生;黄泽烨,中国人民大学商学院硕士研究生,通信作者;沈丽萍,玉溪师范学院工商管理系副教授,玉溪,653100。

引用格式:袁蓉丽,刘梦瑶,黄泽烨,等.企业数字化转型对分析师预测准确性的影响[J].经济与管理研究,2025,46(3):42-60.


Has Corporate Digital Transformation Enhanced the Effectiveness of Compensation Contracts?

—Evidence from Executive Compensation Stickiness

GAO Jieying, HUANG Suqin, HAO Siyuan

(Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070)


Abstract: In the pursuit of high-quality development of China’s digital economy, digital transformation has injected new impetus and competitiveness into physical enterprises. This paper empirically examines whether digital transformation contributes to the enhancement of corporate governance effects and the effectiveness of compensation contracts, using data from Chinese listed companies from 2011 to 2021.

The results indicate that digital transformation restrains executive compensation stickiness (ECS), and this conclusion remains robust after a series of endogeneity and robustness tests. Mechanism analysis reveals that digital transformation can restrain ECS by reducing information asymmetry and alleviating principal-agent problems. Additionally, this paper finds that digital transformation can leverage internal governance and oversight effects to address deficiencies in compensation control and supervisory board supervision, thus further suppressing ECS. Further analysis shows that the inhibitory effect of digital transformation on ECS is more pronounced in companies with lower internal control quality, lax external audit supervision, and a strong incentive for executive compensation manipulation. This paper provides a new perspective on exploring the governance mechanism of ECS and offers a decision-making reference for enterprises to reasonably utilize digital technology to enhance their competitiveness.

Based on the above conclusions, this paper puts forward the following policy recommendations. First, enterprises should vigorously promote digital transformation, for example, by jointly holding digital operation forums with excellent counterparts and inviting enterprise leaders to discuss the difficulties and best practices of digital transformation. Second, enterprises can conduct continuous data governance with relevant departments to achieve real-time visualization of performance evaluation data and maximize the incentive effect of compensation contracts. Third, the government can implement differentiated measures, combine digitalization with enterprise management and innovation, and introduce policies to restrict sky-high executive compensation and ensure fair profit sharing among executives, employees, and shareholders.

The marginal contributions of this paper are as follows. First, it investigates the internal governance effect of digital transformation, enriching the literature on the economic consequences of digital transformation. Second, it discusses the influencing factors of ECS from the perspective of technological change leading to changes in organizational structure and governance system, thereby enriching the theoretical basis for the causes of ECS. Third, it integrates corporate digital transformation and ECS into a unified analytical framework and deeply explores the effect of digital transformation on ECS and its influencing pathways, the influencing factors in the relationship between digital transformation and ECS, as well as the differences in the effect of digital transformation on ECS under different situations.

Keywords: digital transformation; executive compensation stickiness; asymmetry information; principal-agent problem; compensation contract

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