村集体参与对农地流转市场化发展的影响及作用机制

——基于农地转出户的考察

马亚飞¹高芸芸²吕剑平²

（1.华南农业大学；2.甘肃农业大学）

内容提要：农地流转市场化发展是实现资源优化配置，提高农业生产效率的重要举措。本文基于2017年中国农村家庭追踪调查（CRHPS）数据，运用普通最小二乘回归模型、机制检验模型和分组回归模型实证考察村集体参与农地流转对农地流转市场化发展的影响及作用机制。研究结果显示，村集体能够推动农地流转市场化发展，该结论经过内生性分析和稳健性检验后仍然成立。机制检验结果表明，村集体参与主要通过降低农地流转交易成本、撕裂农地流转“差序格局”以及缓解农地流转信息不对称的路径促进农地流转市场化发展。异质性分析结果显示，对有新型农业经营主体和弱宗族网络关系村庄的农户而言，村集体参与市场化农地流转的促进效应更大。进一步分析结果表明，村集体参与提高了农地流转纠纷发生的概率，这说明村集体在参与农地流转过程中可能会因执行偏差问题引发农地流转矛盾，不利于农地流转市场的长期发展和乡村治理水平的提升。为促进农地流转市场健康有序发展，要积极发挥村集体的组织和服务功能，合理界定村集体与农地流转市场的关系，充分保障农民土地财产权益以及健全承包地流转价格形成机制。

关键词：村集体参与；农地流转市场化；交易成本；差序格局；信息不对称

作者简介：马亚飞，华南农业大学经济管理学院博士研究生，广州，510642；高芸芸，甘肃农业大学财经学院讲师，通信作者，兰州，730070；吕剑平，甘肃农业大学财经学院教授。

基金项目：国家社会科学基金西部项目“六盘山区易地搬迁农户的生计可持续发展模式变迁与扶贫效应研究”（19XSH021）；甘肃省哲学社会科学规划青年项目“小农户参与农业全产业链的增值收益机制研究——基于行为偏好选择视角”（2022QN016）；甘肃省哲学社会科学规划项目“甘肃省农户耕地撂荒行为驱动因素及治理机制研究”（2023YB035）

引用格式：马亚飞,高芸芸,吕剑平.村集体参与对农地流转市场化发展的影响及作用机制——基于农地转出户的考察[J].经济与管理研究,2025,46(2):58-75.

Impact of Village Collective Participation on Farmland Transfer Marketization and Its Mechanism

—Examination Based on Land Transfer-out Households

MA Yafei¹, GAO Yunyun², LYU Jianping²

(1. South China Agricultural University, Guangzhou 510642;

2. Gansu Agricultural University, Lanzhou 730070)

Abstract: Promoting farmland transfer marketization is an important step in solving the problem of land fragmentation, optimizing the effective allocation of farmland resources, and improving the total factor productivity of agriculture. Therefore, exploring the impact of village collective participation in farmland transfer on farmland transfer marketization has important theoretical significance and practical value for deepening the market-oriented reform of rural land factors and realizing rural revitalization across the board.

Based on the data of land transfer-out households from the 2017 China Rural Household Panel Survey (CRHPS), this paper empirically examines the impact of village collective participation in farmland transfer on farmland transfer marketization and its mechanisms by using the ordinary least squares regression model, mechanism test model, and group regression model. The findings show that village collective participation in farmland transfer can promote farmland transfer marketization. This conclusion still holds after addressing endogeneity problems and conducting robustness tests. The mechanism test shows that this promoting effect is achieved by reducing the transaction costs, breaking down the orderly-diversity pattern, and alleviating the information asymmetry. Heterogeneity analysis reveals that the influence of village collective participation on farmland transfer marketization exhibits a situational dependence effect, which is stronger among new agricultural business entities and farmers in villages with weak clan network relationships. Further analysis shows that village collective participation can increase the probability of farmland transfer disputes. This suggests that implementation biases in village collective participation in farmland transfer may lead to disputes, which are not conducive to the long-term development of the farmland transfer market and the enhancement of rural governance.

The marginal contributions are as follows. First, this paper reveals the influence of village collective participation on farmland transfer marketization, enriching the intrinsic influence mechanism. Second, this paper examines the possible adverse effects of village collective participation on farmland transfer marketization, providing theoretical guidance and decision-making support for the intermediary role of village collectives in facilitating farmland transfer marketization. Third, this paper also examines the heterogeneity effect of village collective participation on farmland transfer marketization and discusses the sample selection problem in the regression model.

On this basis, this paper puts forward the following policy insights: actively leverage the organizational and service functions of village collectives, reasonably define the relationship between village collectives and the farmland transfer market, fully protect farmers’ land property rights and interests, and improve the formation mechanism of contracted land transfer prices.

Keywords: village collective participation; farmland transfer marketization; transaction costs; orderly-diversity pattern; information asymmetry

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