数字平台企业市场力量的特殊性及其反垄断监管的研究

白雪洁¹　娜梅雅²

（1. 南开大学经济与社会发展研究院/数字经济交叉科学中心；2. 南开大学经济学院）

　　内容提要：传统反垄断经济理论和监管体系已经难以适用于数字平台企业，且反垄断法的价值目标在数字平台经济领域中呈现出许多新特征，这就要求对数字平台企业的反垄断监管研究要回归到市场力量这一核心问题上。本文认为与传统市场力量相比，数字平台企业围绕数据资源而形成的市场力量是其特殊性的根源所在，并且这种市场力量可以分为斯蒂格勒式和贝恩式两种形式，分别对应于对自身价格的直接控制能力和实质性提高竞争对手成本的能力。对这两种市场力量的区分，有助于探究传统反垄断监管体系在数字平台经济领域适用不足的原因，并进一步明晰当前对数字平台企业的反垄断监管思路，推动事前监管和事后监管相结合，从而更好地促进数字平台经济健康有序发展。

　　

　　关键词：数字平台企业；市场力量；斯蒂格勒式市场力量；贝恩式市场力量；反垄断监管

　　

　　作者简介：白雪洁，南开大学经济与社会发展研究院/数字经济交叉科学中心研究员、博士生导师，通信作者，天津，300071；娜梅雅，南开大学经济学院博士研究生。

　　

　　基金项目：国家社会科学基金重大项目“大国经济条件下构建自主可控的现代产业体系重大问题研究”（21&ZD099）

　　

　　引用格式：白雪洁,娜梅雅.数字平台企业市场力量的特殊性及其反垄断监管的研究[J].经济与管理研究,2023,44(5):21-35.DOI:10.13502/j.cnki.issn1000-7636.2023.05.002.

　　

Research on Specific Market Power and Antitrust Regulation of Digital Platform Enterprise

BAI Xuejie, NA Meiya

(Nankai University, Tianjin 300071)

　　

　　Abstract: The current digital platform economy is characterized by the rapid expansion of the ecosystem dominated by large enterprises and the emergence of small and medium-sized enterprises, resulting in frequent disruptions. As the core of antitrust lies in market power, this paper mainly focuses on the market power of digital platform enterprises, the incompatibility of traditional anti-monopoly regulation in the digital platform economy, and the implementation of antitrust regulation based on the characteristics of the market power of digital platform enterprises.

　　The importance of market power in antitrust analysis needs to be reconsidered. Both academic research and the judiciary agree that market power plays a crucial role in antitrust analysis. In practice, market power is first identified but then largely ignored in the analysis of suspected anticompetitive behavior, leaving many fundamental issues unresolved. However, scholars began to realize the significance of distinguishing between the Stiglerian market power and the Bainian market power for the antitrust regulation of digital platform enterprises, but the relevant research needs to be deepened. Therefore, the possible marginal contribution of this paper is to analyze the specific market power of digital platform enterprises around data resources, to make a distinction between both market power based on existing studies, and to propose the main ideas of antitrust regulation accordingly.

　　The findings are as follows. First, compared with traditional market power, the specific market power of digital platform enterprises is created by data. Second, this market power can be divided into two forms: the Stiglerian market power and the Bainian market power, corresponding to the ability to directly control their prices and substantially increase competitors' costs. In particular, digital platform enterprises can build on their data advantages, complemented by digital technology, and gain continuous and robust direct control over the price for bilateral users, namely platform operators and consumers. Third, the digital platform economy should pay more attention to the Bainian market power generated around digital resources. It is not only easy to be neglected, but also causes many potential hazards due to the specificity of data, which directly affects the realization of innovation and dynamic efficiency, and indirectly affects the Stiglerian market power. Therefore, the distinction between both forms of market power helps to explore the reasons for the inadequate application of the traditional antitrust regulation in the digital platform economy, further clarify the current thinking on antitrust regulation of digital platform enterprises, and promote the combination of ex-ante and ex-post regulation for the healthy and orderly development of the digital platform economy.

　　Keywords: digital platform enterprise; market power; Stiglerian market power; Bainian market power; antitrust regulation