董事会非正式层级如何影响管理层年报语调操纵？
贺 宏1 熊 健1 史璐寒2
（1. 首都经济贸易大学；2. 河南财经政法大学）
内容提要：非正式层级是董事会发挥监督及治理作用的隐性因素，而这一隐性治理机制对于年报文本信息披露的影响及作用机理仍鲜有研究。本文利用2010—2021年沪深A股非金融上市公司数据，在理论分析的基础上实证检验董事会非正式层级对管理层年报文本语调操纵的影响。研究结论表明：更为清晰的非正式层级有助于董事会高效行使治理与监督职能，进而能够对管理层操纵年报文本语调发挥抑制效应；从作用机理上看，抑制效应可能通过协调代理关系、增强披露意愿及扩大资源掌控等作用路径得以实现；此外，从横截面检验结果看，抑制效应因受到来自董事会及企业特质层面的一系列异质性因素影响而呈现出差异化表现。
关键词：董事会非正式层级；年报文本；管理层年报语调操纵；文本信息披露；董事会治理
作者简介：贺宏，首都经济贸易大学会计学院教授、博士生导师，北京，100070；熊健，首都经济贸易大学会计学院博士研究生，通信作者；史璐寒，河南财经政法大学会计学院讲师，郑州，450046。
基金项目：国家社会科学基金一般项目“重大突发公共事件对企业持续经营能力冲击的评价与应对研究”(21BGL089)；首都经济贸易大学博士研究生科技创新项目“企业对绿色可持续发展关注及认同的研发操纵效应”（2023KJCX067）
引用格式：贺宏,熊健,史璐寒.董事会非正式层级如何影响管理层年报语调操纵?[J].经济与管理研究,2024,45(8):125-144.DOI:10.13502/j.cnki.issn1000-7636.2024.08.007.
How does Board Informal Hierarchy Influence Management's Manipulation of Annual Report Tone?
HE Hong1, XIONG Jian1, SHI Luhan2
(1. Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070;
2. Henan University of Economics and Law, Zhengzhou 450046)
Abstract: Board informal hierarchy (BIH) is an important implicit feature of the board’s role in monitoring and governance. However, there is still a scarcity of research investigating its impact on management’s disclosure of textual information. Based on the principal-agent theory, this paper specifically examines the impact of BIH on management’s manipulation of annual report tone and analyzes the underlying mechanisms. Subsequently, this paper conducts a series of empirical tests on the collected and organized empirical data of A-share non-financial listed companies in China from 2010 to 2021. The findings are as follows.
Firstly, clearer BIH helps boards to efficiently fulfill their governance and supervisory roles, thus inhibiting management’s manipulation of annual report tone. This conclusion still holds after a series of endogeneity and robustness tests.
Secondly, in terms of the influence mechanism, the above inhibitory effect can play a role through the following ways: coordinating the agency relationship, such as strengthening communication and coordination, overcoming managers’ myopia, and reducing agency costs; enhancing the willingness to disclose information timely and releasing earnings preannouncement; and expanding the control of resources, such as allocating financial resources and alleviating financing constraints.
Finally, the cross-sectional tests show that the above inhibitory effect varies due to a series of factors at the board trait level and the firm trait level. Specifically, at the board trait level, the inhibitory effect is more pronounced in sample groups where the chairperson is at the top of BIH, the general manager is not at the top of BIH, the chairperson does not concurrently serve as the general manager, there is a higher frequency of board interactions, or the board exhibits greater stability. At the firm trait level, the inhibitory effect is more significant in sample groups comprising non-state-owned enterprises and those with annual reports audited by non-Big 4 firms, higher levels of strategic diversification, or lower levels of uncertainty in the industrial environment.
In summary, this paper clarifies the reasons for the formation of BIH through relevant theories and further expands the research on BIH’s positive role in governing corporate textual information disclosure methods. At the same time, it also provides an incremental perspective from a board’s governance standpoint on how to regulate the appropriate utilization of tone and wording by management when preparing and disclosing non-digitalized and standardized textual information.
Keywords: board informal hierarchy; annual report text; management’s manipulation of annual report tone; disclosure of text information; board governance