企业数字化转型提升了薪酬契约有效性吗？——来自高管薪酬黏性的证据

高杰英　黄素勤　郝思源

（首都经济贸易大学）

内容提要：本文以2011—2021年中国上市公司为研究样本，考察数字化转型对公司治理效应的发挥以及薪酬契约有效性的影响。研究结果显示，数字化转型提升了企业薪酬契约有效性，抑制了高管薪酬黏性。经过内生性分析及稳健性检验后该结论依然成立。机制分析结果显示，数字化转型通过降低企业信息不对称、缓解委托代理问题抑制高管薪酬黏性，且企业薪酬管制强度和内部职工监事会影响数字化转型对高管薪酬黏性的抑制作用，数字化转型能够发挥内部治理和内部监管效应，弥补薪酬管制不足和职工监事监管不善的问题，进而抑制高管薪酬黏性。异质性分析结果显示，数字化转型对高管薪酬黏性的抑制作用在内控质量较低、外部审计监督不严和高管薪酬操纵动机强烈的企业中更明显。本文在理论上为探索高管薪酬黏性的治理机制提供了新视角，在实践上为企业合理运用数字化技术提升企业竞争力提供了决策参考。

关键词：数字化转型；高管薪酬黏性；信息不对称；委托代理问题；薪酬契约

作者简介：高杰英，首都经济贸易大学金融学院教授，北京，100070；黄素勤，首都经济贸易大学金融学院博士研究生；郝思源，首都经济贸易大学经济学院博士研究生/科研处助理研究员，通信作者。

基金项目：国家社会科学基金一般项目“基于大数据及可解释集成学习的信用风险模型构建与应用研究”（22BTJ016）；首都经济贸易大学重大培育项目“中国系统性金融风险传染机制、测度及预防预警研究”（ZD202202）

引用格式：高杰英,黄素勤,郝思源.企业数字化转型提升了薪酬契约有效性吗?——来自高管薪酬黏性的证据[J].经济与管理研究,2025,46(3):24-41.

Has Corporate Digital Transformation Enhanced the Effectiveness of Compensation Contracts?

—Evidence from Executive Compensation Stickiness

GAO Jieying, HUANG Suqin, HAO Siyuan

(Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070)

Abstract: In the pursuit of high-quality development of China’s digital economy, digital transformation has injected new impetus and competitiveness into physical enterprises. This paper empirically examines whether digital transformation contributes to the enhancement of corporate governance effects and the effectiveness of compensation contracts, using data from Chinese listed companies from 2011 to 2021.

The results indicate that digital transformation restrains executive compensation stickiness (ECS), and this conclusion remains robust after a series of endogeneity and robustness tests. Mechanism analysis reveals that digital transformation can restrain ECS by reducing information asymmetry and alleviating principal-agent problems. Additionally, this paper finds that digital transformation can leverage internal governance and oversight effects to address deficiencies in compensation control and supervisory board supervision, thus further suppressing ECS. Further analysis shows that the inhibitory effect of digital transformation on ECS is more pronounced in companies with lower internal control quality, lax external audit supervision, and a strong incentive for executive compensation manipulation. This paper provides a new perspective on exploring the governance mechanism of ECS and offers a decision-making reference for enterprises to reasonably utilize digital technology to enhance their competitiveness.

Based on the above conclusions, this paper puts forward the following policy recommendations. First, enterprises should vigorously promote digital transformation, for example, by jointly holding digital operation forums with excellent counterparts and inviting enterprise leaders to discuss the difficulties and best practices of digital transformation. Second, enterprises can conduct continuous data governance with relevant departments to achieve real-time visualization of performance evaluation data and maximize the incentive effect of compensation contracts. Third, the government can implement differentiated measures, combine digitalization with enterprise management and innovation, and introduce policies to restrict sky-high executive compensation and ensure fair profit sharing among executives, employees, and shareholders.

The marginal contributions of this paper are as follows. First, it investigates the internal governance effect of digital transformation, enriching the literature on the economic consequences of digital transformation. Second, it discusses the influencing factors of ECS from the perspective of technological change leading to changes in organizational structure and governance system, thereby enriching the theoretical basis for the causes of ECS. Third, it integrates corporate digital transformation and ECS into a unified analytical framework and deeply explores the effect of digital transformation on ECS and its influencing pathways, the influencing factors in the relationship between digital transformation and ECS, as well as the differences in the effect of digital transformation on ECS under different situations.

Keywords: digital transformation; executive compensation stickiness; asymmetry information; principal-agent problem; compensation contract

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