国内统一连续出版物号:CN 11-1384/F

国际标准连续出版物号:ISSN 1000-7636

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新企业进入与在位者探索式创新

新企业进入与在位者探索式创新

肖泽华1 李青原2 王露萌3

(1.湖北大学;2.武汉大学;3.华中农业大学)


内容提要:本文关注市场中新企业进入如何影响在位者探索式创新,研究激励中国企业高质量创新的市场机制及内在逻辑。采用2013—2019年中国的省份-行业层面工商注册数据测度新企业进入,并选取A股上市企业作为在位者样本,研究结果显示新企业进入对在位者探索式创新产生了积极影响。该结论在经过工具变量检验、利用负面清单管理制度进行准自然实验等稳健性检验后依然成立,其机制在于强化对外部竞争的“逃离”及缓解内部代理冲突。进一步研究发现,对于企业间技术差距较大的市场及市场中相对落后的在位者而言,新企业进入促进在位者探索式创新的积极效应更为明显;同时,新企业进入提升了在位者探索式创新的质量,表现为探索性专利具有更高的技术含量和更广泛的市场认可。本文从市场中新企业进入的视角,为企业探索式创新的驱动因素研究提供了中国的增量证据,诠释了中国如何以高标准市场体系赋能前沿性、颠覆性技术创新,突破高质量发展的制度和技术瓶颈。

关键词:新企业进入;探索式创新;竞争逃离;代理冲突;市场格局

作者简介:肖泽华,湖北大学商学院副教授,武汉,430062;李青原,武汉大学经济与管理学院教授、博士生导师,武汉,430072;王露萌,华中农业大学经济管理学院讲师,通信作者,武汉,430070。

基金项目:国家自然科学基金重点项目“环境治理目标下的公司财务、会计和审计行为研究”(72332003);国家社会科学基金青年项目“中美跨境审计监管对中国公司审计质量的影响与对策研究”(23CJY005);湖北省教育厅哲学社会科学研究项目青年项目“基于专利引用网络的湖北省企业颠覆式创新能力评价与激励研究”(24Q075)

引用格式:肖泽华,李青原,王露萌.新企业进入与在位者探索式创新[J].经济与管理研究,2025,46(4):77-98.


New Entrants and Exploratory Innovation of Incumbents

XIAO Zehua1, LI Qingyuan2, WANG Lumeng3

(1. Hubei University, Wuhan 430062;

2. Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072;

3. Huazhong Agricultural University, Wuhan 430070)


Abstract: Firms are the main players in technological innovation. In innovative activities, they can adopt either exploratory or exploitative innovation strategies. The former involves searching for and discovering new knowledge to explore new possibilities, while the latter involves using and improving existing knowledge to utilize established certainties. China needs to strengthen the exploratory innovation strategy, independently developing core technologies in key fields and building unique advantages at the forefront of global technological change, thereby adding high-quality momentum to the development of new quality productive forces.

This paper uses business registration data provided by CnOpenData at the industry-region level to measure new entrants. Additionally, Chinese A-share listed companies are considered as incumbents, and their innovation strategies are identified based on the technological attributes revealed by the International Patent Classification (IPC) of patents. On this basis, this paper examines whether new entrants serve as a positive factor for incumbents’ exploratory innovation.

The findings indicate that entrants make incumbents more inclined towards exploratory innovation. This conclusion remains valid after instrumental variable tests and quasi-natural experiments utilizing China’s negative list system. The underlying mechanism is attributed to the escape from external competition and the alleviation of internal agency conflicts. Further research reveals that the marginal positive effect of new entrants on incumbents’ exploratory innovation is more pronounced in laggards and when the technological gap among firms in the market is large. Moreover, entrants enhance the quality of exploratory innovation, characterized by higher technological sophistication and broader market recognition.

Starting from the new entrants as an incentive factor, this paper seeks pathways to enhance the technological innovation capabilities of Chinese firms. It enriches the research on factors that can stimulate exploratory innovation from the perspective of new entrants. Based on the choice of innovation strategies, this paper provides Chinese evidence for the welfare brought by new entrants, expanding the theoretical boundaries of research on the impact of new entrants on incumbents’ innovation behavior. This paper also offers theoretical support for empowering exploratory technological innovation vitality through the construction of a high-standard market system. To cultivate the development of new quality productive forces through technological innovation, it is essential to continuously reform market entry regulations, create high-standard market conditions and institutional guarantees for new entrants, eliminate unreasonable barriers, and ensure effective market incentives for firms dedicated to sustained exploratory innovation.

Keywords: new entrants; exploratory innovation; competition escaping; agency conflict; market pattern

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