机构投资者分心与劳动收入份额

张家轩　徐玉德

（中国财政科学研究院）

内容提要：提高劳动收入份额是优化收入分配结构、实现共同富裕的重要途径。本文以2007—2022 年中国沪深A股上市公司为研究样本，通过构建机构投资者分心指标验证机构投资者分心对企业劳动收入份额的影响。研究发现，机构投资者分心降低了企业劳动收入份额；机构投资者分心弱化了对企业的监督治理和决策治理，进而降低了劳动收入份额；不同的机构投资者分心对企业劳动收入份额存在异质性影响，相较于压力敏感型和其他类型的机构投资者，压力抵制型机构投资者的分心程度对劳动收入份额的负面影响更明显；此外，机构投资者分心程度对劳动收入份额的负面影响在劳动者议价能力弱的企业中更明显。本文的研究拓展了机构投资者分心的经济后果和企业劳动收入份额的影响因素研究，为监管部门深入理解机构投资者在企业劳动收入分配中的重要影响并制定推动收入分配公平和共同富裕等相关政策提供理论参考。

关键词：机构投资者分心；劳动收入份额；有限关注；内部薪酬差距；人力资本结构

作者简介：张家轩，中国财政科学研究院博士研究生，北京，100142；徐玉德，中国财政科学研究院研究员、博士生导师。

基金项目：国家社会科学基金社科学术社团主题学术活动资助项目“新时代国有经济布局优化和结构调整研究”（23STA017）

引用格式：张家轩,徐玉德.机构投资者分心与劳动收入份额[J].经济与管理研究,2025,46(9):93-107.

Institutional Investor Distraction and Labor Income Share

ZHANG Jiaxuan, XU Yude

(Chinese Academy of Fiscal Sciences, Beijing 100142)

Abstract: Increasing the labor income share is crucial to optimizing income distributions, achieving common prosperity, and promoting high-quality economic development. As key players in the capital market, institutional investors are more likely to exert influence on firms’ decision-making, thereby affecting corporate labor income share. However, current research mainly focuses on the supervisory and managerial functions of institutional investors in corporate governance, with limited exploration of the specific impact of institutional investor distraction on corporate labor income share.

From the perspective of behavioral finance, this paper examines the impact of institutional investor distraction on corporate labor income share by taking the distraction caused by extreme return shocks in unrelated industries as an exogenous shock in portfolio management. Then, based on data from China’s A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2022, this paper verifies the underlying mechanism from the perspectives of supervisory governance and decision-making governance. Meanwhile, it conducts further analysis from the perspectives of institutional investor type and labor bargaining power to ensure the reliability of the conclusion.

The findings reveal that institutional investor distraction can reduce corporate labor income share, and the conclusion remains valid after considering possible endogeneity issues and conducting a series of robustness tests. This mechanism operates mainly by weakening the governance of firms’ internal pay structure and hindering the optimization of their human capital structure. Heterogeneity analysis indicates that stress-resistant institutional investors exert a more significant influence on labor income share compared to stress-sensitive and other types of institutional investors. Furthermore, the influence of institutional investor distraction is stronger in firms with weak labor bargaining power than in those with strong labor bargaining power.

This paper provides innovative evidence for inter-firm differences in labor income share from the perspective of external regulatory deficiencies, enriching and expanding the research on the factors affecting corporate labor income share and the economic consequences of institutional investor distraction. The recommendations are as follows. Institutional investors should optimize the attention allocation mechanism and strengthen their participation in the ongoing governance of portfolio companies to avoid the negative impact of distraction. Listed companies should be aware of the fairness of income distribution and the importance of institutional investors in the governance of labor income distribution, and establish a mechanism to cope with fluctuations in institutional investor attention. The regulatory authorities should attach great importance to the role and influence of institutional investors in labor income distribution, improve the behavioral guidelines for institutional investors, strengthen the supervision of labor rights and interests protection, and guide institutional investors to take an active part in the formulation and implementation of firms’ policies on labor income distribution.

Keywords: institutional investor distraction; labor income share; limited attention; internal pay gap; human capital structure

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