竞争政策、上游竞争冲击与企业高质量创新

于良春　宫园园

（山东大学）

摘要：竞争政策是激励企业高质量创新的关键制度支撑。本文基于2017—2024年沪深A股制造业上市公司数据，以2022年修订《中华人民共和国反垄断法》作为政策冲击，采用连续双重差分模型考察反垄断规制形成的上游竞争冲击对企业高质量创新的影响。研究发现，修订的反垄断法对上游垄断行为的规制提升了下游企业的高质量创新水平，该结论在一系列稳健性检验后仍然成立。机制分析表明，上述影响主要通过降低中间成本、缓解融资约束以及引致下游企业竞争实现。异质性分析结果显示，上游竞争冲击对下游企业高质量创新的激励作用在竞争性行业、高科技行业以及非国有企业中更明显。本文拓展了竞争政策创新有效性的研究视角，为推动经济高质量发展中的竞争政策完善提供了政策启示。

关键词：上游竞争冲击；竞争政策；高质量创新；反垄断法；非对称垂直结构

作者简介：于良春，山东大学经济学院教授、博士生导师，济南，250100；宫园园，山东大学经济学院博士研究生，通信作者。

引用格式：于良春，宫园园. 竞争政策、上游竞争冲击与企业高质量创新[J]. 经济与管理研究，2026，47（8）：102-117.

Competition Policy, Upstream Competition Shock, and Corporate High-Quality Innovation

YU Liangchun, GONG Yuanyuan

(Shandong University, Jinan 250100)

Abstract: Innovation is the driving force for high-quality economic development. As an important reference in the anti-monopoly enforcement process, it has been incorporated into China's anti-monopoly law revised in 2022. Under an asymmetric vertical competition structure, upstream monopolistic behaviors capture the innovation gains of downstream firms, exerting a negative impact on the innovation behaviors of downstream firms. Therefore, as China's competition policy framework continues to evolve, it remains to be thoroughly explored whether the upstream monopolistic behaviors have been effectively regulated, whether such regulation has alleviated the negative effect on the innovation of downstream firms, and what the underlying mechanisms are. Taking high-quality innovation as the primary task, exploring the impact of competition policy on the upstream and downstream industrial chains is crucial for promoting research on competition policy in the market system.

This paper introduces the assumption of asymmetric competition between upstream and downstream firms into the heterogeneous firm monopolistic competition model, constructing a benchmark model that includes upstream monopolistic firms and downstream heterogeneous monopolistic competition firms. It also incorporates competition policy and innovation behaviors into the model to depict how competition policy affects firms' high-quality innovation under the asymmetric vertical structure. Empirically, using data from A-share listed manufacturing companies in China from 2017 to 2024, this paper treats the implementation of the revised anti-monopoly law as a quasi-natural experiment and applies a continuous difference-in-differences model to examine the impact of the upstream competition shock generated by anti-monopoly regulations on the high-quality innovation of downstream firms.

The findings reveal that the revised anti-monopoly law enhances high-quality innovation of downstream firms by regulating upstream monopolistic behaviors. This conclusion remains valid after a series of robustness tests. Mechanism tests indicate that the enhancing effect is mainly achieved through reducing intermediate costs, alleviating financing constraints, and inducing competition among downstream firms. Heterogeneity analysis shows that the positive effect is more pronounced in competitive industries, high-tech industries, and non-state-owned firms.

The possible marginal contributions are threefold. First, this paper investigates the effectiveness of competition policy and its coordination with industrial policy under the high-quality innovation paradigm from a vertical industrial chain perspective. Second, it introduces competition policy and innovation behaviors into the asymmetric vertical structure and proposes a new mechanism by which competition policy regulates upstream monopolistic behaviors and then induces innovation among downstream firms, yielding new conclusions. Third, it provides a factual basis and references for the assessment of competition policy and the subsequent policy adjustments and optimization under the high-quality innovation paradigm.

Keywords: upstream competition shock; competition policy; high-quality innovation; anti-monopoly law; asymmetric vertical structure

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