ESG表现抑制企业过度金融化吗？

王 越¹　阳 镇^2,3　陈 劲³

（1.中国人民大学；2.中国社会科学院；3.清华大学）

内容提要：引导企业合理适度配置金融资产，为壮大实体经济注入资金动能，对于中国实现经济高质量发展和推进中国式现代化具有重要的现实意义。本文以2009—2021年沪深A股非金融上市公司为研究样本，实证研究ESG表现对实体企业过度金融化的影响及其内在机理，并考察外部金融监管以及管理者自利在ESG表现与企业过度金融化之间的交互效应。研究结果表明，ESG表现对企业过度金融化行为产生抑制效应，说明ESG具有可持续投资价值导向，能够引导企业合理配置企业资产、承担对利益相关方的多元责任。机制检验结果表明，ESG表现通过提升企业信息透明度抑制企业过度金融化行为。交互效应检验结果表明，外部金融化监管有效抑制企业过度金融化行为，替代了ESG表现对企业过度金融化的抑制效应；管理者自利导致管理者选择投资具有高额回报率的金融项目以获取更多的私利，削弱了ESG表现对企业过度金融化的抑制效应。异质性分析结果表明，ESG表现对企业过度金融化的抑制效应在位于东部地区的企业、民营企业以及不具有高管金融背景的企业中更为明显。本文的研究为政府政策以及企业战略的制定提供了启示。

关键词：ESG表现；过度金融化；信息透明度；金融监管；管理者自利

作者简介：王越，中国人民大学财政金融学院博士研究生，北京，100872；阳镇，中国社会科学院工业经济研究所副研究员，清华大学技术创新研究中心兼职研究员，通信作者，北京，100006；陈劲，清华大学经济管理学院/技术创新研究中心教授、博士生导师，北京，100084。

基金项目：国家社会科学基金重点项目“支撑企业新质生产力的创新模式与创新政策研究”（24AGL018）；中国社会科学院学科登峰战略企业管理优势学科建设项目（DF2023YS25）；中国社会科学院“青启计划”项目“中国式现代化进程中的ESG驱动机制研究”(2024QQJH107）

引用格式：王越,阳镇,陈劲.ESG表现抑制企业过度金融化吗?[J].经济与管理研究,2025,46(1):50-70.

Does ESG Performance Inhibit Corporate Excessive Financialization

WANG Yue¹, YANG Zhen^2,3, CHEN Jin³

(1. Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872;

2. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100006;

3. Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084)

Abstract: Guiding enterprises to moderately allocate financial assets and injecting capital into the real economy is of great practical significance for China to achieve high-quality economic development and promote Chinese modernization. However, the phenomenon of enterprises shifting from real to virtual is still prevalent. Thus, this paper takes A-share non-financial listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2009 to 2021 as research samples, explores the inhibiting factors of the problem of enterprises shifting from real to virtual, and examines the specific impact of ESG performance on corporate excessive financialization and its mechanism.

The findings are as follows. First, ESG performance plays a crucial role in restraining corporate excessive financialization. Second, improving corporate information transparency is an important mechanism in this restraining process. Third, both external financialization supervision and managerial self-interest weaken the restraining effect. Fourth, this restraining effect is more evident in enterprises located in the eastern region, private enterprises, and enterprises where executives lack a finance background.

This paper provides valuable insights for governments to formulate effective policies and enterprises to develop ESG development strategies. For the government, it needs to accelerate the construction and improvement of ESG information disclosure systems in line with China’s national conditions and combine ESG soft supervision with local government financial hard supervision to effectively guide enterprises to rationally allocate their financial assets. For enterprises, the concept of ESG should be regarded as the strategic choice of enterprise development, and corporate excessive financialization should be restrained by the soft supervision effect, and enterprises should be guided to gradually shift from virtual to real and rationally allocate their own assets, and finally achieve high-quality development.

The contributions of this paper are threefold. First, it explores the theoretical transmission framework and the main mechanism of ESG and corporate excessive financialization, enriching the traditional research framework of corporate financialization. It also verifies the resource allocation effect under the guidance of sustainable development of ESG, expanding the research on the value effect of ESG. Second, it further discusses the interaction between external financial supervision and internal managerial self-interest on ESG performance and corporate excessive financialization, which has practical significance for improving the government financial supervision system and optimizing corporate internal governance structure. Third, it provides new inspiration for re-understanding the heterogeneity of enterprises shifting from real to virtual, enterprises’ reasonable allocation of financial assets, and for the government to properly supervise corporate financialization.

Keywords: ESG performance; excessive financialization; information transparency; financial regulation; managerial self-interest

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