大股东减持影响战略激进度吗？

陈彦亮¹　任海霞¹　高闯²

（1. 山东工商学院；2. 首都经济贸易大学）

内容提要：企业通过维持适当的战略激进度以实现稳中求进，进而筑牢企业高质量发展的基石是当前理论研究和管理实践的重点议题之一。本文基于委托代理理论，以2008—2020年中国A股上市公司为样本，关注大股东减持和战略激进度二者之间的关系以及管理层代理效率在其中的调节作用。研究结果显示，大股东减持能够提高战略激进度，减持比例越大，减持后的战略激进度越高；同时，代理效率在这一过程中发挥着负向调节作用。进一步研究结果表明，绩效期望差距和高管团队稳定性在大股东减持与战略激进度的关系中起部分中介作用。异质性分析结果显示，在管理者为男性的企业、管理者学历较高的企业、两职分离的企业和衰退期企业中，大股东减持对战略激进度的提升作用更为明显。本文拓展了企业战略激进度的影响因素研究，深化了有关大股东减持经济后果的探讨，为企业所有者作出科学决策、防范战略风险提供了一定的参考。　　

关键词：大股东减持；战略激进度；代理效率；绩效期望差距；高管团队稳定性

作者简介：陈彦亮，山东工商学院国际商学院教授，烟台，264005；任海霞，山东工商学院会计学院硕士研究生；高闯，首都经济贸易大学工商管理学院教授、博士生导师，北京，100070。

基金项目：国家社会科学基金专项课题“新时代企业家精神培育的双螺旋驱动机制、路径与对策研究”（18VSJ084）

引用格式：陈彦亮,任海霞,高闯.大股东减持影响战略激进度吗?[J].经济与管理研究,2024,45(3):125-144.DOI:10.13502/j.cnki.issn1000-7636.2024.03.008.

　　

　　

Does Major Shareholders' Holding Reduction Affect Strategic Radicalization?

CHEN Yanliang¹, REN Haixia¹, GAO Chuang²

(1. Shandong Technology and Business University, Yantai 264005;

2. Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070)

　　

　　Abstract: Ensuring stability and building a solid foundation for the high-quality development of enterprises are at the forefront of theoretical research and management practice. Based on the principal-agent theory, this paper aims to explore the relationship between the major shareholders' holding reduction and strategic radicalization, the moderating effect of management's agency efficiency, and the heterogeneity issues.

　　This paper conducts the empirical analysis by using the multiple regression model and taking A-share listed companies in China from 2008 to 2020 as samples to provide support for corporate managers to make scientific decisions and prevent strategic risks. The findings are as follows. Firstly, major shareholders' holding reduction can be positively correlated with strategic radicalization. After a series of endogeneity and robustness tests, this conclusion is still valid. Secondly, the agency efficiency of management plays a negative moderating role. Specifically, the higher the agency efficiency, the stronger the negative moderating effect. Thirdly, the performance expectation gap and the stability of the top management team play a mediating role. Fourthly, major shareholders' holding reduction significantly improves enterprises' strategic radicalization with male managers, managers with higher educational qualifications, CEO duality, and enterprises in the recession period.

The marginal contributions of this paper are as follows. Firstly, it broadens the research scope of the signaling theory and strengthens its explanatory and predictive power. Secondly, it offers a new perspective for a comprehensive understanding of the motivation of management's strategic decision-making. Thirdly, it examines the moderating effect of agency efficiency on the above mechanism and explores the impacts under different internal and external conditions through heterogeneity test, which is a useful supplement to the existing literature. The findings hold certain practical significance. On the one hand, major shareholders should maintain a rational prediction of the increase in strategic radicalization caused by holding reduction, communicate with the management timely, avoid damage to firm operation due to information asymmetry, and comprehensively consider factors such as the development stage, the internal governance mechanism and the heterogeneity of the top management team, to achieve effective intervention in the adjustment of strategic radicalization. On the other hand, standardizing major shareholders' holding reduction and cultivating and improving the manager market are long-term mechanisms for enterprises to operate steadily and achieve sustained development.

　　Keywords: major shareholders' holding reduction; strategic radicalization; agency efficiency; performance expectation gap; stability of top management team

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