国内统一连续出版物号:CN 11-1384/F

国际标准连续出版物号:ISSN 1000-7636

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税收分成激励与地方财政韧性——基于省以下增值税分成改革的准自然实验

税收分成激励与地方财政韧性

——基于省以下增值税分成改革的准自然实验

贾智莲1 李悦1 卢盛峰2

(1.内蒙古财经大学;2.武汉大学)

摘要:提升地方财政韧性是统筹发展与安全、应对不确定性冲击的关键支撑。系统探究其背后的体制性驱动因素,对于理顺政府间财政关系、夯实地方财政安全根基具有重要意义。本文将2016年“营改增”后省以下增值税分成改革作为准自然实验,选取2013—2024年275个地级及以上城市面板数据,运用双重机器学习模型进行因果效应识别,系统考察省以下税收分成激励影响地方财政韧性的逻辑与作用边界。研究发现,税收分成激励增强了地方财政韧性。机制分析表明,税收分成激励能够抑制税收竞争、提升税收努力、降低债务风险,进而增强了地方财政韧性。异质性分析结果显示,在市场化水平低、宏观税负高、产业结构相对初级的城市,财政韧性增强效应更明显。本文为优化增值税分享制度,重塑地方财政激励机制提供了理论支撑与经验证据。

关键词:税收分成激励;地方财政韧性;税收竞争;税收努力;债务风险

作者简介:贾智莲,内蒙古财经大学财政税务学院教授,呼和浩特,010070;李悦,内蒙古财经大学财政税务学院硕士研究生,通信作者;卢盛峰,武汉大学经济与管理学院教授、博士生导师,武汉,430072。

基金项目:国家社会科学基金一般项目“土地依赖和债务风险交叠下的地方财政韧性机制研究”(23BJY024);内蒙古自然科学基金项目“基于多税种协同的税收分成影响地方财政韧性的机制研究”(2026MS0205);内蒙古地方财政研究中心项目“债务置换的财政韧性效应:兼论韧性陷阱的形成条件”(DFCZ202605)

引用格式:贾智莲,李悦,卢盛峰. 税收分成激励与地方财政韧性:基于省以下增值税分成改革的准自然实验[J]. 经济与管理研究,2026,47(11):3-18.



Tax Sharing Incentives and Local Fiscal Resilience

—A Quasi-Natural Experiment from the  Sub-Provincial VAT Sharing Reform

JIA Zhilian1, LI Yue1, LU Shengfeng2

(1. Inner Mongolia University of Finance and Economics, Hohhot 010070;

2. Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072)

Abstract: Enhancing local fiscal resilience is crucial for preventing and mitigating unpredictable risks and for coordinating high-quality development with high-level security. Amid mounting global uncertainties and domestic structural constraints, Chinese local governments face pressing fiscal challenges, highlighting the need to optimize intergovernmental fiscal relations and unlock local fiscal incentives. This paper treats the 2016 sub-provincial value-added tax (VAT) sharing reform following the nationwide replacement of business tax with VAT as a quasi-natural experiment. Using panel data from 275 prefecture-level and above cities in China from 2013 to 2024, this paper applies a double/debiased machine learning framework to identify the causal effect of tax sharing incentives on local fiscal resilience.

The findings show that tax sharing incentives enhance local fiscal resilience. This conclusion holds after endogeneity analysis and a series of robustness tests. Mechanism analysis reveals three complementary channels. First, tax sharing incentives curb inter-regional race-to-the-bottom tax competition. Stronger sharing incentives increase local governments’ dependence on long-term tax base growth, reducing predatory tax breaks, fiscal rebates, and factor concessions, stabilizing tax policy expectations, and encouraging quality-oriented tax-source competition. Second, they strengthen tax effort. Higher VAT retention ratios increase the marginal return to tax administration, encourage stricter tax-source monitoring and enforcement, narrow the gap between actual and potential tax revenues, reduce evasion, and improve fiscal extraction capacity. Third, they reduce local government debt risks. Stable and autonomous fiscal resources ease structural fiscal gaps, weaken passive borrowing incentives, reduce reliance on volatile land transfer revenues and implicit debt, release fiscal space, and improve risk-buffering and self-recovery capacity. Heterogeneity analysis indicates that this positive effect is more pronounced in cities with low marketization, high macro tax burdens, and relatively primitive industrial structures.

Accordingly, this paper proposes three policy recommendations. First, it is essential to optimize the sub-provincial VAT sharing mechanism and strengthen grassroots incentive compatibility by establishing flexible sharing coefficients, standardizing revenue assignment, and improving cross-regional tax-source sharing. Second, efforts should be made to build a supporting fiscal system linking incentives and constraints to unleash the effectiveness of three transmission paths, including stabilizing sharing expectations, aligning tax collection authority and responsibilities, and linking debt control performance with VAT revenue settlement and transfers. Third, it is crucial to improve supporting mechanisms for the sharing reform by establishing a dynamic monitoring system that combines sharing incentives with fiscal resilience, incorporating tax competition, tax effort, and debt risks into the monitoring of reform effects. These measures can help address local fiscal difficulties, strengthen fiscal security, and promote high-quality development.

Keywords: tax sharing incentives; local fiscal resilience; tax competition; tax effort; debt risk


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