非国有股东治理与国有企业高质量发展——基于资本配置的视角

陈艳利　戚乃媛

（东北财经大学会计学院）

　　内容提要：如何激发资本活力，以提高全要素生产率助推国有企业高质量发展，成为深化混合所有制改革的重要议题。本文深入分析混合所有制改革背景下非国有股东参与治理对国有企业高质量发展的作用机制。研究结果表明：（1）非国有股东持股与委派均能够显著提高国有企业高质量发展程度，并且非国有股东参与治理效果在低竞争性行业的提升空间更强；（2）从资本要素配置“速度-效率”的视角分析，非国有股东持股与委派不仅显著促进资本要素流向更高效率的经营活动，同时也显著加快国有企业向最优资本结构的调整速度，进而提高全要素生产率，为国有企业高质量发展提供动力源泉；（3）非国有股东参与治理对国有企业高质量发展的促进作用在中央层级、管理层权力较小、引入民营资本的国有企业中更加显著。本文研究结论为深入推进混合所有制改革、优化资本要素配置、促进国有企业高质量发展提供一定的参考。

　　关键词：非国有股东治理；国有企业；高质量发展；资本配置；股权结构；治理结构

　　

　　作者简介：陈艳利，东北财经大学会计学院教授、博士生导师，通信作者，大连，116025；戚乃媛，东北财经大学会计学院博士研究生。

　　

　　基金项目：国家自然科学基金面上项目“国有资本授权经营：效果评价与机制探索”（72073019）；教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目“分红监管视角下竞争性国有企业非国有股东治理研究”（20YJA790004）

　　

　　引用格式：陈艳利,戚乃媛.非国有股东治理与国有企业高质量发展——基于资本配置的视角[J].经济与管理研究,2023,44(5):124-144.DOI:10.13502/j.cnki.issn1000-7636.2023.05.008.

　　

Non-state-owned Shareholder Governance and High-quality Development of State-owned Enterprises

—A Perspective of Capital Allocation

CHEN Yanli, QI Naiyuan

(Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian 116025)

　　

　　Abstract: As the ballast and pillar of economic growth, the capital allocation of state-owned enterprises is not only the focus of the capital factor market, but also an important path to promote the high-quality development of enterprises. How to stimulate capital vitality, improve total factor productivity and promote the high-quality development of state-owned enterprises becomes a critical issue in deepening the mixed ownership reform. Therefore, this paper analyzes the influence mechanism of non-state-owned shareholder participation on the high-quality development of state-owned enterprises, and the moderation of government control level, management power, and non-state capital types.

　　The results are as follows. First, both the shareholding and the appointment of non-state-owned shareholders can significantly improve the high-quality development of state-owned enterprises. Specifically, when the ratio reaches 3%, non-state-owned shareholders will gain the right of substantial influence. Second, compared with high-competition industries, the participation of non-state-owned shareholders has a stronger promoting effect in low-competition industries, which has more room to improve the governance effects. Third, from the speed-efficiency perspective of capital factor allocation, both the shareholding and the appointment of non-state-owned shareholders significantly promote the capital flow towards more efficient business activities, and accelerate the adjustment to the optimal capital structure, thereby improving total factor productivity and providing a source of power for the high-quality development of state-owned enterprises. Forth, the impact of non-state-owned shareholder participation is more significant in state-owned enterprises at the central level, with less management power, and introducing private capital.

　　These conclusions provide some reference value for further promoting the mixed ownership reform and the high-quality development of state-owned enterprises. First, for enterprises with a more stable capital structure and more diversified capital investment, it is advisable to select external investors (such as having a 3% appointment qualification condition). Second, it should actively encourage private capital to participate in the mixed ownership reform, and further strengthen the supervision and restraint of management power operation. Third, it is necessary to focus on the performance of market-oriented capital investment returns, continuously meet the requirements of the development strategy of optimizing the capital structure and empowering the high-quality development of state-owned enterprises.

　　Keywords: non-state-owned shareholder governance; state-owned enterprise; high-quality development; capital allocation; ownership structure; governance structure