数字平台互操作的经济激励及其福利效应

唐要家　张哲　王钰

（浙江财经大学经济学院）

　　内容提要：面对大量的平台封禁行为，互操作成为数字平台反垄断监管存在争议的政策问题。本文采用寡头竞争模型分析数字平台互操作的激励及福利效应。结果显示，在平台对称竞争情况下，互操作会增加两个平台的利润并提高社会总福利，但互操作可能会提高平台向商家收取的费用。在平台间不对称竞争情况下，小平台总是具有互操作激励，而大平台只有在互操作收益较高时才有激励实行互操作。单向互操作政策与双向互操作政策相比，双向互操作政策会带来更高的社会总福利。因此，数字平台互操作政策应该合理平衡多元目标和多重利益的关系，优先激励采用双向互操作政策，并设计激励性接入费机制来促进支配平台主动实施互操作。

　　

　　关键词：数字平台；互操作；福利效应；反垄断监管；经济激励

　　

　　作者简介：唐要家，浙江财经大学经济学院教授，杭州，310018；张哲，浙江财经大学经济学院硕士研究生；王钰，浙江财经大学经济学院博士研究生。

　　

　　基金项目：教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目“数字经济数据-算法-平台三位一体关系与反垄断政策创新研究”（22JJD790008）

　　

　　引用格式：唐要家,张哲,王钰.数字平台互操作的经济激励及其福利效应[J].经济与管理研究,2023,44(3):60-71.DOI:10.13502/j.cnki.issn1000-7636.2023.03.004.

　　

　　

Economic Incentives and Social Welfare of Interoperability Between Digital Platform

TANG Yaojia, ZHANG Zhe, WANG Yu

　　(Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics, Hangzhou 310018)

　　

　　Abstract: With the apparent trend toward market concentration, dominant digital platforms have incentives to implement platformblocking strategies to maintain and enhance their market power. Therefore, interoperability policies become an important option to address digital platform monopolies, but the optimal design and implementation of such policies is a topic of intense debate. This paper uses an oligopoly competition model of digital platforms to analyze the incentives for platform interoperability and the impact of different interoperability policy patterns on platform users and social welfare.

　　The main findings are as follows. First, in the case of symmetric competition, interoperability increases the profits of both platforms and enhances overall social welfare. However, it increases the relative market power of digital platforms and may raise the fees charged by the platforms to merchants. Second, in the case of asymmetric competition, two-way interoperability leads to higher profits for the smaller platform, so it has a strong incentive to interoperate. However, the incentive for the larger platform depends on the benefit of interoperation. Only when the benefit is higher will the larger platform have the incentive to interoperate with the smaller one. Therefore, two-way interoperability between platforms still enhances social welfare. Third, comparing one-way and two-way interoperability policies under asymmetric competition, the large platform prefers two-way interoperability, while the small platform prefers one-way interoperability. Furthermore, one-way interoperability only leads to higher social welfare when the average benefit is smaller for the large platform, resulting in lower social welfare than two-way interoperability in other cases.

　　The main policy recommendations are as follows. First, promoting interoperability between platforms should be an essential tool for antitrust regulation to address the market power of digital platforms. Thus, the interoperability policy should focus on the corresponding obligation requirements for gatekeeper platforms. Second, the design of digital platform interoperability policies should avoid the decision-making thinking of a unilateral market and the concentration on a single plaque of market competition. It requires a reasonable weighing of multidimensional objectives such as market competition, transaction fairness, efficient utilization of data elements, and maximizing the total social welfare of multiple subjects as the basis for policy selection. Third, priority should be given to incentivizing the adoption of two-way rather than one-way interoperability policies. Fourthly, designing an incentive access fee mechanism is necessary to encourage the dominant platform to implement interoperability proactively.

　　Keywords: digital platform; interoperability; welfare effect; antitrust regulation; economic incentive