多个大股东影响企业成本粘性吗？

栾甫贵¹ 赵康乐¹ 梁日新¹ 纪亚方²

（1. 首都经济贸易大学会计学院；2. 郑州轻工业大学经济与管理学院）

 

内容提要：股权结构安排对微观企业的成本管控有重要的影响。本文利用2007—2019年沪深A股上市公司数据，探究多个大股东对于企业成本粘性的影响。研究结果表明，多个大股东提高了企业成本粘性；同时，相对于控股股东而言，其他大股东的持股比例越大，企业成本粘性越高。区分多个大股东类型后，本文排除了多个大股东的合谋假说，进一步验证了多个大股东的冲突假说。此外，本文结论表明多个大股东的冲突效应在家族企业中更显著。影响机制分析结果表明，采用管理费用率和过度投资衡量代理问题时，多个大股东通过加剧管理层代理问题进而增加成本粘性。进一步研究表明，多个大股东对企业成本粘性的增强作用在管理层持股比例较低、信息透明度较差的企业中更为显著；当企业处于经济环境不确定性较高时期，多个大股东对企业成本粘性的增强作用更显著。本文的研究丰富了多个大股东和成本粘性领域的文献，有助于企业客观理性地认识多个大股东的影响。

 

关键词：多个大股东；成本粘性；代理问题；管理层持股；信息透明度
 

作者简介：原东良，兰州大学管理学院青年研究员，兰州，730000；李燕，南开大学商学院博士研究生，天津，300071。

 

基金项目：国家社会科学基金一般项目“重大突发公共事件对企业持续经营能力冲击的评价与应对研究”（21BGL089）； 首都经济贸易大学博士生学术新人计划项目（2022XSXR03）

 

引用格式：栾甫贵,赵康乐,梁日新,等.多个大股东影响企业成本粘性吗?[J].经济与管理研究,2022,43(12):118-141.DOI:10.13502/j.cnki.issn1000-7636.2022.12.008.

　　

　　

Do Multiple Major Shareholders Affect Enterprise Cost Stickiness?

LUAN Fugui¹, ZHAO Kangle¹, LIANG Rixin¹, JI Yafang²

(1. Capital University of Economics and Business;
2. Zhengzhou University of Light Industry)

　　

　　Abstract: The ownership structure arrangement significantly affects the cost control of micro-enterprises. This paper explored the impact of multiple major shareholders on enterprise cost stickiness using the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2007 to 2019. The findings show that having multiple major shareholders improves enterprise cost stickiness. At the same time, compared with the controlling shareholder, the larger the shareholding proportion of other major shareholders, the higher the cost stickiness. After distinguishing the type of multiple major shareholders, this paper excluded the collusion hypothesis and further confirmed the conflict hypothesis of multiple major shareholders. Moreover, the conflict effect of multiple major shareholders is more significant in family firms. The results of the impact mechanism analysis reveal that when the management expense ratio and overinvestment are used to measure agency problems, multiple major shareholders increase cost stickiness by exacerbating management agency problems. Furthermore, the enhancement of multiple major shareholders on cost stickiness is greater in enterprises with low management shareholding ratios and poor information transparency, particularly in terms of high economic uncertainty. The findings may contribute to the literature in the field of multiple major shareholders and cost stickiness, and help enterprises understand the impact of multiple major shareholders objectively and rationally.

 

　　Keywords: multiple major shareholders; cost stickiness; agency issue; management shareholding; information transparency