非实际控制人的董事会话语权对国有企业创新的影响研究

李维安^1,2 衣明卉^1,3

（1.天津财经大学商学院；2.南开大学中国公司治理研究院； 3.山东工商学院会计学院）

 

内容提要：本文基于2013—2018年中国A股国有上市公司数据，研究被赋予董事会话语权的非实际控制人对国有上市公司创新的治理效应。研究结果表明，非实际控制人董事会话语权对国有上市公司创新具有显著的正向影响，且其拥有的董事会话语权越大，创新投入和发明专利产出越多；从分类、分层角度来看，非实际控制人董事会话语权对创新的治理效应在商业竞争类和地方国有上市公司更为显著；机制检验结果表明，高管薪酬是非实际控制人董事会话语权影响创新的重要路径；当实际控制人存在掏空行为时，非实际控制人董事会话语权对创新投入和发明专利产出的影响更为显著；同时，股权制衡度和非实际控制人性质也会影响非实际控制人董事会话语权对创新的治理效应。

 

关键词：混合所有制改革；非实际控制人；董事会话语权；创新；国有上市公司

 

作者简介：李维安，天津财经大学商学院教授、博士生导师，天津，300222；南开大学中国公司治理研究院教授、博士生导师，天津，300071；衣明卉，天津财经大学商学院博士研究生；山东工商学院会计学院讲师，通讯作者，烟台，264005。

 

基金项目：国家自然科学基金面上项目“突发事件应急社会治理的协同机制研究”（72174096）；国家自然科学基金面上项目“董事会断层、非正式层级与决策质量研究”（71572081）；国家社会科学基金一般项目“中国上市公司ESG理念的行为响应、动力机制及推进策略研究”（21BGL101）

 

引用格式：李维安,衣明卉.非实际控制人的董事会话语权对国有企业创新的影响研究[J].经济与管理研究,2022,43(11):95-114.DOI:10.13502/j.cnki.issn1000-7636.2022.11.006.

　　

　　

Research on the Influence of Board Voice of Non-actual Controller on Innovation of State-owned Companies

LI Weian^1,2, YI Minghui^1,3

(1. Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222;
2. Nankai University, Tianjin 300071;
3. Shandong Technology and Business University, Yantai 264005)

　　

　　Abstract: Based on the data of China’s A-share state-owned listed companies from 2013 to 2018, this paper investigates the governance effect of non-actual controllers who are given the voice of the board of directors on the innovation of state-owned listed companies. The results show that the board voice of non-actual controllers has a significant positive impact on the innovation of state-owned listed companies, and the greater the board voice, the more innovation input and invention patent output. From the perspective of classification and stratification, the governance effect of non-actual controllers’ board voice on innovation is more significant in commercial competitive companies and local state-owned listed companies. The mechanism test reveals that executive compensation is important for the board voice of non-actual controllers to influence innovation. At the same time, the influence of the board voice of non-actual controllers on innovation input and invention patent output is more significant when the actual controller has tunneling behavior. Moreover, the degree of equity balance and the nature of non-actual controllers also influence the governance effect of non-actual controllers’ board voice on innovation.

 

　　Keywords:  mixed-ownership reform; non-actual controller; voice of board of directors; innovation; state-owned listed company